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KOIZUMI'S REFORM OF SPECIAL CORPORATIONS
By: Dr. Susan Carpenter*

When Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi assumed office in April 2001
he pledged to initiate extensive structural reforms that would bring Japan's
deflation-ridden economy back on track and renew consumer confidence. His
mantra 'structural reform without sanctuary' brought memories of former Prime
Ministers Morihiro Hosokawa and Maruyama's attempts at reforming the
political and economic system during three turbulent years from 1993-1996.
Koizumi's proposed reforms encompass three areas: (i) fiscal reforms;
(ii) state-sector reforms; (iii) tackling the non-performing loans (NPL). He also
promised to downgrade the Liberal Democratic Party, the party that has
dominated national and local politics since 1955 and over which he presides as
the president.
Nearly three years later, despite Koizumi's efforts, the process of
reform has occurred slowly, giving voters, who had high expectations that
Japan's worst post-war recession would come to an end, the distinct impression
that Koizumi's reforms may be more an image of the effort to reform. Although
Japan's economy continues to lag with land prices falling for the twelfth
consecutive year at 7.4%, retail sales falling for the twelfth consecutive year and
sales at the larger supermarkets and department stores falling 1.2 percent for the
sixth consecutive year in 20031, the government pronounced in October 2003
that the economy was 'showing movement of incipient recovery', projecting a
2% growth in the GDP by 2006. The projection is based on an 18-month
consecutive rise in private sector activity that is generated chiefly by exports to
Asia (40%), the United States and the EU. Mercantile policies have been
fundamental to the bureaucracy's planning of economic and industrial policies
during Japan's post-war economic growth. Yasutaru Yamamoto, an economist
at the Sumitomo Life Research Institute warned that dependence on external
demand to revitalize the economy would only be a temporary solution. The real
problems were structural and unless these were dealt with full economic
recovery would not take place. Certainly the strengthening of the yen against
foreign currencies this3 year has raised concerns among Japanese manufacturers
that their exports will not be competitive in the global market. As the dollar slid
down to ¥105 the government spent V7.15 trillion on currency-market
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intervention in January to keep the yen from further appreciating. It had used
¥420 trillion in 2003 compared to Y7.64 in 1999.
1. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND SMALL BUSINESS OWNERS
BEAR THE BRUNT
The Cabinet Office released a report in December 2003 indicating that
Japan's net assets at the end of 2002 shrank by 3.4 percent from 2001 to 2.79
quadrillion yen, for the fifth consecutive year. Since the end of 1990 assets have
shrunk 21.2 percent. The Health, Labor and Welfare Ministry announced on
January 25 that Y27.65 billion in 2002 wages went unpaid due to the lag in
corporate profits.
The Cabinet's approved Y82 trillion budget for fiscal year 2004 is 0.4
trillion larger than the 2003 budget, which was topped up with Y¥150.5 billion for
the remainder of 2003. At the end of fiscal 2004, the outstanding debts of the
national and local governments together will amount to Y719 trillion or 143.6%
of the GDP, the highest among the 30 member countries in the OECD.
Government expenditures for public works are 2-3 times more than in the U.S.
and the EU.4
The most troubling aspect of the recession is the serious and
debilitating financial conditions in many of the prefectures and in the small and
medium-size business sector. Local governments generate only 20-30% of tax
revenue and thus must rely heavily on central government for the subsidization
of public works projects, welfare and education. Referred to as '30% autonomy'
the prefectures, in return for the support, are obliged to follow policies set by the
national ministries.5 The coffers of the majority of the prefectures are dry but
Koizumi, as a part of his reform strategy to decrease public funding, is cutting
subsidization by Y1 trillion to local governments in 2004. This is still ¥40
billion more than last year. In return local government ostensibly will have
more autonomy in planning policies, although there is intense resistance in
Tokyo to this enforced decentralization. Clearly, local governments will have to
be creative in the distribution of waning wealth. However, during Japan's postwar era local governments have deferred the forging of policy to the national
ministries and local government officers do not have enough experience to deal
with the budget crunch.
The government's predictions of Japan's economic upswing may be
overly optimistic since regional banks are shouldering 54% or Y23.8 trillion of
all non-performing loans. While the state is cutting subsidies to local
governments for public works, it is simultaneously taking over local banks to
ensure that local banks remain solvent. The government seized Ashigawa Bank
in Tochigi Prefecture on December 1, 2002.

4 The Japan Times Online (25 December 2003).
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The shinkin, the local state-lending institutions are slated for enormous
injections of funds from the state. The Financial Times reported on January 5
that Fitch, the credit rating agency, claimed that 153 of the 314 shinkin are in
need of substantial government financing. Fitch advised that the number should
be reduced to 200 through consolidation. The LDP had given the go-a-head to
the Financial Service Agency on December 1, 2003 to inject Y2 trillion into
regional banks if there are strong indications that the banks can recover. But
members of the Japan Democratic Party, the largest opposition party, claim that
the selection of institutions to be salvaged will inevitably hinge on political
favoritism.
Small and medium-size business owners have been severely hit by
Japan's continuing deflation. Small businesses account for 99% of the business
activity in Japan and employ around 70% of the workforce. Since the early
1990s thousands of small businesses have collapsed. As an example, in the
month of October 2001 alone, small business bankruptcies were up by 11.7
percent or 1,911 as compared to October 2000.6 Orders from large companies,
the primary procurers, are slow not only because domestic demand is down but,
also, because the larger firms have moved operations abroad to countries where
labor and parts are cheaper. Again, the state is intervening to prevent further
deterioration of small and medium -size businesses. The Ministry of Economy
Trade and Industry (METI) announced last November that it would establish
corporate revival funds for small and medium-size businesses to be distributed
by the Japan Small and Medium Enterprise Corporation, one of its special
corporations, which has offered long-term, low-interest rate loans since the
1950s. The private sector is being asked to share the responsibility of funding
50% of the loans. Oita Prefecture businesses were slated to receive the first
funds in January. 7
II. NON-PERFORMING REFORMS
Recent editorials in Japanese newspapers have been highly critical of
Koizumi's efforts, claiming that he has backpedaled on his proposed reforms
and that, indeed, the 2004 budget reflects that '...no substantial headway will be
made in the coming fiscal year on the reform front.' Heist Takanaka, the state
minister of financial, economic and fiscal policy, claimed that in order to
support a recovery' the government must '...make good signs appear in regional
economics and employment' and that...'govemment also needs to make sure
that structural reforms will move forward by tackling priority issues:
reforms of
8
the pension system, postal services and the local taxation system.'
In an effort to reduce public debt, which was 130% of GDP in 2001,
Koizumi intended to privatize the Postal Savings Agency and downsize
dramatically the Fiscal Investment Loan Program (FILP), the two bodies that
6

Ibid, 88.

7 The Japan Times Online (25 November 2003).
8 The Japan Times Online (15 October 2003).
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fund public works projects and public corporations. Indeed, Koizumi pointed
his finger directly at public corporations as a main target of his reform efforts.
The front page headline of the October 10, 2001 issue of the Nikkei Shimbun
proclaimed that Koizumi was determined to cut public financing to special
corporations (one of a number of types of public corporations in Japan) by onethird, strictly review their applications for budget supplementation and, more
importantly, restructure them, concentrating on those bodies with massive debts.
Among the special corporations named were the Japan Highway Corporation,
the Japan National Oil Corporation and the Government Housing and Loan
Corporation.
However, the privatization of the Postal Savings Agency has been put
on hold and the reform of the pension fund has yet to begin. Minister of Health,
Labor and Welfare Chikara Sakaguchi confessed, 'At this time, we are only
determining the amount of the burden in relationship to payouts. We have yet to
delve into the basic framework of the pension system.' 9 The reform of special
corporations is also problematic because Koizumi is meeting with stiff
opposition from members of his own party and from the national ministries who
established and manage the corporations.
Koizumi's reforms have essentially come to a standstill proving beyond
doubt that, like Hosokawa and Maruyama, Koizumi is a victim of his country's
political and economic system, a system that was once touted to be the reason
for the 'Japan miracle' but, in fact, is the very reason why Koizumi cannot
implement substantial reforms.
III. THERE WERE HIGH HOPES FOR HOSOKAWA
In 1992, the recession and the acknowledged need for action to ignite
Japan's lagging economy triggered a struggle for power among factions of the
LDP, resulting in some members defecting to form two new parties, the New
Japan Party (Shin Nihon), led by Hosokawa, and the Pioneer Party (Sakigaki) led
by Ichiro Ozawa. In August 1993, Hosokawa, a former governor of KitaKyushu, was appointed to the office of prime minister, raising the hope among
Japanese citizens that the government was going to deal with the recession and
initiate political reforms. The government tried to jump-start the economy by
releasing several fiscal stimulus packages, much of the funds going to public
works projects to give contracts to businesses in the prefectures and to keep
unemployment figures down. Unfortunately, after serving only eight months in
office, Hosokawa resigned in April 1994 amidst rumors that he had accepted a
loan from Sagawa Kyubin, a parcel delivery service whose previous loans to
other politicians caused a political scandal.
A struggle for power between the New Japan Party and the Pioneer
Party ensued, revealing that there was serious disagreement among party
members. Tsutomu Hata, a member of the New Japan Party, who was the
Minister of State, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the vice-prime minister in
9
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Hosokawa's Cabinet, served as prime minister for four months. Tomoichi
Murayama, a Socialist, was appointed prime minister in August 1994. Forming
a coalition Cabinet composed of members of the Japan New Party, the LDP and
the Socialist Party, he began to push for a review of bureaucratic powers and to
attempt reforms of the political system itself in order to end the relationship
between politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen, and thus bring Japan into the
same league as other developed economic powers. This movement set off a
power struggle between politicians and bureaucrats, who were intent on keeping
control over the regulation of the economy.
Murayama's administration suffered from political in-fighting and the
continuing recession. A series of unfortunate incidents including the
government's handling of the Kobe Earthquake on 17 January 1995 and the
administration's approval of the constitutionality of the self-defense force and
the acceptance of the Japan-U.S. security agreement led voters to return the LDP
to power with Prime Minister Ryutaru Hashimoto at the helm. Frustrated
members of the New Japan Party and the Pioneer Party returned to the LDP fold
or entered long-established opposition parties. Nevertheless, the process, of
reform, at least in principle, had begun.'
IV. A SYSTEM THAT DEFIES RAPID REFORM
In his column, 'Inside Japanese Politics' for the major daily news
source Asahi, Toru Haying stated the primary reason for Koizumi's failure to
push through his reforms: 'The ties among the government, bureaucracy and
business circles are irrefutable realities that are difficult to reform. Reforms
could be carried out by only ten like-minded friends who were also determined
to reform. But Koizumi has no such friends, which exposes his weakness by
being obliged to leave everything to bureaucrats and politicians with vested
interests.'l'
Japan's political economic system can be characterized as an intricate
network of interpersonal relationships between the bureaucracy, big business
and politicians, a system that began during the Meiji period (1868-1914) when
Japan emerged from feudalism and began to industrialize. The bureaucracy was
endowed with inordinate powers to administrate land reform and Japan's
industrialization. The family-owned oligopolies, known as zaibatsu (a few of
them were established in the 17th century), co-operated with the bureaucracy by
financing the construction of power plants and steel mills. The zaibatsu were
involved in such industries as banking, mining, retail, textiles, trade,
shipbuilding, and steel production. The Second World War intensified the
relationship between business and the bureaucracy as the state took full control

'0Carpenter, Susan. Special Corporationsand the Bureaucracy: Why Japan Can'tReform
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) 23-24.
" Asahi.com (31 December 2003).
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of industries and the central bank pumped money into banks that were set up to
fund the production of munitions and military supplies.' 2
Despite Japan's defeat the bureaucracy became even stronger after the
war. The Occupational Forces led by the Supreme Commander of the Allied
Powers (SCAP) purged war criminals as one of its punitive measures. SCAP
had intended to dismantle the zaibatsu, forcing the owners to relinquish all of
their stocks and forbidding cross share-holdings among the zaibatsu. In
addition, 2,000 top executives were dismissed. Nevertheless, due to the
beginning of the Cold War in 1945 and the perceived threat of communist
expansion in the Pacific SCAP reversed a number of its reforms. In order to
secure a strong and conservative ally in the Pacific the majority of the
companies, related through a keiretsu, were allowed to continue operating with
minor reforms. The bureaucracy that had administered the war effort along with
top ministry officials was given extraordinary power to resuscitate Japan's wardevastated economy.
A new constitution along with a new electoral system was set up by
SCAP but this effort did not entirely encourage an appreciation of the
democratic process among the Japanese, who had been ruled for over a thousand
years by either an imperial family, a military regime or by a mighty
bureaucracy. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that was established in 1955
as a result of the coalition of two conservative parties has dominated Japanese
politics, with the exception of a short respite from 1993- 1996. The party has
consistently supported the national ministries' post-war policies, allowing the
ministries to maintain tight control over their industrial sectors.
The
bureaucracy is also intimately involved in other realms of Japanese society and,
indeed, the prime minister and his Cabinet are subject to ministerial guidance,
13
indicating that the executive branch is too weak to push through reforms.
V. SPECIAL CORPORATIONS: THE INSTITUTIONS THAT
PERPETUATE THE SYSTEM
Special corporations (tokushu hojin) are types of public corporations
that Japan's national ministries established after the Second World War to aid in
the resuscitation of industry and the reconstruction of infrastructure. They
include corporations for public construction work, public finance, banks and
research. The corporations receive funds through FILP, often referred to as
Japan's 'secondary budget.' FILP was established in 1953 and can be described
as a huge financial organ operated by the public sector. Postal savings is the
largest part with another entity being the public pension fund. Tax revenue from
both national and local governments is also a source of funding and
supplementing of budgets.

12

Carpenter, Susan. Special Corporationsand the Bureaucracy: Why JapanCan't Reform
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13Ibid, 53.
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The corporations are linked to the industrial sectors under the
administrative jurisdiction of each ministry. For example, the Ministry of
Construction (renamed in 2001 the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and
Transport) established the Japan Highway Corporation in 1956 to rebuild
highway networks. The corporation awards contracts to construction companies
and funds these projects through FILP.
The Ministry of Finance established the Japan Development Bank
(JDB) in 1953 to aid in Japan's economic recovery. The Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) (renamed in 2001 the Ministry of
Economy Trade and Industry) founded the Japan Finance Corporation for Small
Businesses in 1955 to give long-term, low interest loans to small businesses.
Again, the loans are funded by FILP. Other METI corporations are the Japan
National Oil Corporation (JNOC) and the Japan External Trade Organization
(JETRO). Special corporations that have international recognition are the Japan
Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), Japan Telephone and Telegraph (NTT) and
the Japan Foundation.14
Officially, the ministries do not manage their corporations, but in
general, the Japanese are aware that the ministries manage corporations defacto
through officials, who are sent to fill upper management positions.
By 1972, Japan had achieved an astounding annual growth rate of 10
percent gross domestic product. Realistically, by that time, many special
corporations were no longer necessary to support economic growth and rebuild
infrastructure, and ideally, they should have been dismantled. However, the
ministries had come to rely on their corporations because not only did they
provide post-retirement positions for officials, but they also served to extend
ministerial powers and to increase administrative jurisdiction (namely,
'territory').
The reform of special corporations became big news with the cover
story in the February 12, 1997 issue of Japan's largest business weekly, Nikkei
Business. The story claimed that while special corporations were founded on
the precept that the work executed would serve national interests the opposite
was, in fact, true for the following reasons:
(i) special corporations receive funding from
sources that are difficult to trace.
(ii) special corporations can set up subsidiaries
(kogaisha, magogaisha) that show profits even
though the parent corporations are in debt.
(iii) the ministries establish special corporations
as their subsidiaries to provide temporary
employment for staff and post-retirement
positions for retired senior officials before they
move to the private sector.

14Ibid, 14.
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(iv) special corporations spend funds to do work
that is in the best interests of the corporations
(for example, ministries).
There were a number of interviews including one with Kan Kato, the
Director of Chiba Commercial College. He emphasized that the funding of
special corporations was a serious problem because the ministries had the power
to use the money at their discretion without seeking the consent from the Diet.
Politicians support this behavior because they solicit contracts from special
corporations involved in public works for their constituents. In 2002 the
Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Post and Telecommunications
reported that the streamlining of corporations began in 1995. In 1996 there were
ninety-two corporations. By 1999 the number had decreased by fourteen to
eighty-four. During that year the eighty-four special corporations received ¥256
billion in subsidies from the National Treasury and in 2000 the amount rose to
Y258 billion.
By April 2002 seven more corporations had been privatized or
dismantled bringing the number down to seventy-seven. One of the privatized
special corporations was the long Term Credit Bank of Japan, established by
MITI (now METI) in the early 1950s. The bank was in financial trouble when
Ripplewood, an American venture-capital company, purchased it in 1999. Two
other banks that MITI had established in 1950s as special corporations-the Japan
Export-Import Bank (EXIM) and the Bank for Overseas Economic Cooperation
were consolidated in 1998. It is interesting to note that most of the corporations
that were dissolved had large outstanding loans and were merged with more
solvent special corporations.15
VI. AMAKUDARI: THE TIES THAT BIND THE SYSTEM
TOGETHER
The Japanese civil service system permits retiring officials to take
higher management positions in industry, while at the same time receiving
benefits from their former ministries. Known as amakudari or 'descent from
heaven', the movement of former bureaucrats to the private sector can forge a
link between retired officials and officials in the ministries, and thus promote
close cooperation between industry and the bureaucracy. To Western observers,
this tight relationship between the ministries and industry appeared to be a major
strength of the Japanese political economic system. However, in reality, these
interpersonal mutual obligation- mutual protection networks act as mechanisms
that rigidify the system, thus inhibiting adaptation to the demands of the
changing environment of the global economy.
The National Public Service Law stipulates that retiring civil servants
must wait for two years before taking positions in corporations in the sectors
their ministries manage. Nevertheless, they may move directly to upper
15Ibid, chapter 2.
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management positions in special corporations and other public corporations,
receiving salaries simultaneously from their ministries. Most officials will wait
out the two-year period of grace in public corporations and then slip into upper
management positions in private companies. It is generally understood that civil
servants like to establish public corporations in order to carve out positions for
themselves and their colleagues.
The Japanese generally accepted amakudari because it was one of the
incentives that attracted talent into the ministries where retirement age can be
ten years earlier than in the private sector and, where salaries tended to be lower
than in the private sector. Before the recession they believed that elite civil
servants had created an economy that was impervious to failure, however, from
1992 onwards the stagnation of Japan's economic growth, coupled with the
revelation of collusion between the Ministry of Construction and the
construction industry, and between the Ministry of Finance and the banking
industry, triggered a political movement by opposition parties to abolish
amakudari. In addition, there were growing demands that all special
corporations be dismantled, or at least the number reduced, not only because
some have massive debt and are a drain on public funding, but equally, they are
the vehicles that civil servants use to migrate smoothly into positions in private
companies. 16
VII.

THE MURKY SIDE OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS

The conditions for the establishment of special corporations are
unclear. Most Japanese know very little about special corporations except that
they are prolific employers and big spenders. Even the government has
difficulty defining the exact characteristics of special corporations other than
they assist the government in promoting national interests.
Although the government has not defined special corporations clearly,
they can be viewed as being corporations based on a national law, which has
been approved by the National Diet. Special corporations were established
according to special establishing procedures through a special law, the Law
Establishment Act, Article 4-11 subject to the Ministry of General Affairs
(renamed in 2001 the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and
Telecommunications). The law is neither civil nor corporate. For example, the
Japan Highway Corporation was founded according to the 'Japan Highway
Corporation Law,' the Japan Development Bank was established through the
'Japan Development Bank Law,' and the Japan National Oil Corporation was
established according to the 'Japan National Oil Corporation Law'.
VIII. THE MAZE OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
There is a much larger category of public corporation (koeki hojin) that
are classified as associations (shadan) and foundations (zaidan), the number
16
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being estimated as greater than 26,000. Approximately 6,879 corporations are
managed at the central government level and the rest are managed at the local
government level. The number of associations and foundations differ from
ministry to ministry. The Ministry of Education (renamed the Ministry of
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology) has the largest number (1,800) with
the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry a joint
second with around 900 each.
And to further confuse the issue of reform of public corporations there
is yet another category known as chartered corporations (ninka hojin). They are
managed at the national level and include the Central Bank of Japan, the Japan
Red Cross, the Mutual Aid Society of Local Government Employees and the
Chamber of Commerce and Industry. In terms of size they resemble special
corporations but they are not subject to evaluation by the Cabinet or the National
Diet. The number grew to ninety-nine by 1978 but has since decreased through
dissolution, privatization or consolidation to eighty-seven. In 2001 special
corporations and chartered corporations received Y5 trillion in tax revenue.
Although the number of special corporations may seem insignificant in
relationship to the overall number of public corporations, many public
Indeed, special
corporations are subsidiaries of special corporations.
corporations tend to breed more public corporations, providing post-retirement
positions for civil servants and consuming public funds. Koki Ishii, a member of
the Democratic Party of Japan, the main opposition party, was serving a third
term in the House of Representatives of the National Diet when he was
assassinated by a right-wing sympathizer on October 25, 2002. lishi, whose
concerns centered on political and administrative misconduct, contended that
special corporations and public corporations should be the focal point of
structural reform. In 1999 he published a book Bureaucrat Heaven: The
Bankrupting of Japan (Kanryo Tenkoku Nihon Hassan) followed by The
Parasites That Are Gobbling Up Japan: Dismantle All Special Corporations
and Public Corporations (Nihon wo Kuistuku Tokushu Hojin Koeki Hojin wo
Zenhaiseivo) in 2001. Although his book may appear to be an effort on behalf
of his party to weaken the bureaucracy and loosen the ministry ties with the
ruling LDP, his report poses pertinent questions concerning the rapid escalation
of public corporations that have been established through special corporations
and government agencies, and the employment opportunities they offer elite
bureaucrats. lishi maintained that special corporations have 2,000 subsidiaries
and that these employ over 10,000 people. He also claimed that public
corporations employed 3.8 percent of Japan's population or 4,900,000 people.
lishi contended that before structural reform could progress, special
corporations and public corporations should be dismantled. He believed that
there had been no reform of any kind and that the reluctance of the ministries to
reform public corporations, and thus preserving their territory, symbolized the
rigidity of Japan's political and economic system, a system that inhibited
reform.
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IX. PUBLIC CORPORATIONS: WHY SO MANY?
The number of corporations gradually increased since the end of the
Second World War. For example, the Ministry of Construction established ten
corporations in 1959 and by 1955 there were twenty-six. During Japan's period
of economic growth, ten further public corporations were established annually.
By 1960, the number had increased to fifty-two, by 1965 there were 102 and by
1970, the Ministry of Construction had established 144. Another forty were
added to the list by 1975, by 1980 the total was 240 and by 1990 the number had
grown to 326. Among 322 of these corporations, 43 percent employed less than
ten people and only 9 percent had more than one hundred staff.
The other ministries established public corporations at the same rate or
even faster than the Ministry of Construction and it was a simple procedure
because all that was necessary to establish a new one was the writing of an
'establishment act' in the name of the corporation and a request to an obliging
17
Diet to sanction it.
X. THE STREAMLINING OF SPECIAL CORPORATIONS
Koizumi aims to dissolve, privatize or convert into independent
administrative institutions (IAI) the 163 special corporations and chartered
corporations. Koizumi expects that the conversion of thirty-eight special
corporations and chartered corporations into IAIs will eventually wean them off
of public funding. Similar to the 'law for the establishment of special
corporations' the 'law for the establishment of independently administrative
institutions' is neither a civil law nor a corporate law. Amakudari is permitted in
IAls.
Koizumi is facing stiff opposition in the privatization of special
corporations from the ministries, in charge of administering the reforms, and
from members of his own party. Bureaucrats opt to leave the ministries to run
for political office, often on the LDP ticket. With this kind of support
mechanism in place, it is highly unlikely that the ministries will feel any
pressure to relinquish their organizations.
XI. HOLDING ONTO A GOOD THING
The struggle to privatize the Japan Highway Corporation (JH)
illustrates Koizumi's uphill battle to reform the public sector. Its debts are a
whopping Y617.477 billion. lishi
labels it 'the world's largest general contractor' because it handles the
construction for highways and toll roads throughout Japan. In theory, the JH
repays loans from FILP with revenue collected from highway tolls, but these
tolls are not sufficient to cover repayment of loans. The JH has over sixty
17Ibid, chapter
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subsidiaries with such names as New Japan Highway Patrol, Sapporo Engineer,
Hokkaido Service, Sendai Highway Service, Number One Highway Service,
Highway Service Research, and Japan High Car.
Originally Koizumi wanted to consolidate the JH with three other
public corporations- the Hanshin Expressway Corporation, the Metropolitan
Expressway Public Corporation and the Shikoku-Honshu Bridge Authority,
which carry debts totaling Y40 trillion, and then cut the single entity into six
private companies and an asset-holding organization that would collect the
debts. Koizumi called for the privatized firms to pay off debts within thirty
years (he later extended the period to forty-five years). Koizumi also wanted to
cut government spending on highway construction (highway construction
budget exceeds ¥300 billion annually), which would lead to a 40 percent
reduction in road building and the cancellation of lucrative contracts. Members
of his own party whose constituents are small and medium-size businesses in
rural Japan, who depend upon construction contracts and who traditionally have
contributed large sums to LDP candidates, were vehemently opposed to the
consolidation of the highway construction corporations and to the termination of
highway construction.
The implementation of Koizumi's privatization plans has played like a
soap opera with politicians slugging it out with bureaucrats and with each other.
Last September land minister Nobuteru Ishihara charged Haruho Fujii, the
president of the JH and former administrative vice-minister of the Ministry of
Construction, with hiding the negative worth of the JI-I and being an obstacle to
the privatization of the corporation. Ishihara demanded his resignation. On
October 7 Fujii said that he was not about to step down and called for a hearing.
On October 12 Ishihara accused Fujii of threatening to blackmail him by
divulging information regarding dishonest land deals that involved prominent
politicians. The nine-hour hearing on October 17 commenced but it only
delayed the inevitable and Ishihara fired Fujii on October 24. Fujii is now suing
Ishihara and the secretary general of the LDP Shinzo Abe for libel.
In December Koizumi picked one of Ishihara's colleagues, Takeshi
Kondo, a member of the Upper House of the LDP, to serve as president of the
JH. He also chose a panel of advisors to assist in the process of privatization.
Although Kondo pledged to privatize the JH by 2005 a large block of members
from his own party (some of who were former bureaucrats), who feel that their
seats are secure as long as they procure construction contracts for their
constituents, are no more inclined to cooperate than Fujii. Thus the saga
continues.
On December 21, the government released an announcement that the
construction of 2,000 km of unfinished highways out of the originally planned
9,343 km of roads would be completed with the JH together with the national
and local governments footing the bill of Y13.5. On the following day two
members of the advisory board resigned in protest, accusing Koizumi of
presenting a watered-down version of his original reform proposals and ignoring
their recommendations. They warned that the new version served the interests
of road construction and would lead to massive debts. It was highly improbable
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that the debts would be repaid because borrowing for the construction will
continue and tolls will be used as collateral. Also, the public corporations would
not be completely privatized because government would still control the roads
and the collection of tolls.
XII.

SPECIAL CORPORATIONS: THE INSTITUTIONS THAT
MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO

As Japan's deflation continues the vested interests of business owners,
politicians and ministry officials are clearly crippling Koizumi's attempts at
solid structural reforms. Reform appears to be simply a bailout by the state of
bankrupt banks and public and private corporations. From 1999-2003 public
money to the tune of Y10.433 was poured into failing banks, including two
regional banks (Ishikawa and Chubu). Resona Holdings, a bank whose primary
borrowers are small and medium-size companies, was partially nationalized in
June 2002 with an injection of $17 billion. Another public corporation, the
Industrial Revitalization Corporation of Japan (IRCJ), was formed in April
200318 to salvage businesses from bankruptcy. The IRCJ plans to save 100
companies during the next five years by buying up all of their stock and then
trying to restructure them. Some of the businesses that have been rescued are
Mitsui Mining and Kinmom Manufacturing, a producer of gas and water meters
whose bank is Resona Holdings. The most recent acquisition by the IRCJ is the
giant cosmetic and textile manufacturer Kanab, which will be funded with ¥366
billion yen taken from public funds and tax revenue. Tax revenue meets
approximately fifty percent of government expenditures.
Despite the government's insistence that Japan is on the road to
economic recovery the tone of daily editorials in the major newspapers is
pessimistic. The level of poverty in the rural areas is steadily climbing as small
businesses continue to struggle. The editorial in the March 4, 2004 issue of the
Asahi stated: 'What about affluence? When we say Japan is the world's second
largest economy in the world, the view is primarily based on our gross national
product (GDP), which is the world's second largest after the United States. In
per capita terms, we slump to about fifth among industrially advanced
countries...'
Although the recession and burgeoning public debt have brought about
public recognition that the ministries use their corporations for their own
purposes, the Japanese continue to defer the administration of reforms to their
elite civil servants. Special corporations serve to perpetuate the interpersonal
networks between the public and private sectors thus maintaining a political
The ministries'
economic system that cannot easily adapt to change.
determination to maintain territory can be seen in the continued operations of
special corporations despite urgent calls for their dissolution.
Special corporations are at the heart of Japanese government and bind
the system together. Koizumi recently announced that he is not totally opposed
18
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to amakudari if the bureaucrats are better qualified for the post than personnel
from the private sector. A recent example of this backpedaling is the
announcement on March 12 that Masahiko Kurono, former vice-minister of
Transport, will be appointed as the president of the Narita International Airport
Authority, a special corporation. The Japanese seem to be content with
deferring to government policy and continue to vote into office LDP candidates.
A pronounced move towards ultra-conservatism could be witnessed last year
when the Liberal Democratic Party welcomed into its fold the right-wing
Komeito Clean Party, which once had been one of the major opposition parties.
What do these trends portend for Japan's future relationship with the
United States, her staunch ally and, until recently, her largest trading partner?
Since the political economic system remains fundamentally in tact there is little
indication that Japan's policies concerning security or trade will change
substantially. Japan's trade policies with the US will remain for some time
linked to its reliance on US military security and US markets. Koizumi is
committed to President Bush's policies in Iraq, sending military support.
Indeed, this may be a justification for an amendment of Japan's constitution that
would permit the Japanese people to have a full-fledged military.
[This article contains excerpts from Special Corporationsand the Bureaucracy:
Why Japan Can't Reform. Little has been written in English about Japanese
public corporations, which are under intense scrutiny by the Japanese media.]
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